Abstract. An individual's learning rule is completely uncoupled if it does not depend on the actions or payoffs of anyone else. We propose a variant of log linear learning that is completely uncoupled and that selects an efficient pure Nash equilibrium in all generic nperson games that possess at least one pure Nash equilibrium. In games that do not have such an equilibrium, there is a simple formula that expresses the long-run probability of the various disequilibrium states in terms of two factors: i) the sum of payoffs over all agents, and ii) the maximum payoff gain that results from a unilateral deviation by some agent. This welfare/stability trade-off criterion provides a novel framework for analyzing the selection of disequilibrium as well as equilibrium states in n-person games.
Learning equilibrium in complex interactive systems
Game theory has traditionally focussed on situations that involve a small number of players.
In these environments it makes sense to assume that players know the structure of the game and can predict the strategic behavior of their opponents. But there are many situations involving huge numbers of players where these assumptions are not particularly persuasive.
Commuters in city traffic are engaged in a game because each person's choice of route affects the driving time of many other drivers, yet it is doubtful that anyone 'knows the game' or fully takes into account the strategies of the other players as is usually posited in game theory.
Other examples include procedures for routing data on the internet, and the design of information sharing protocols for distributed sensors that are attempting to locate a target.
These types of games pose novel and challenging questions. Can such systems equilibrate even though agents are unaware of the strategies and behaviors of most (or perhaps all) of the other agents? What kinds of adaptive learning rules make sense in such environments? How long does it take to reach equilibrium assuming it can be reached at all? And what can be said about the welfare properties of the equilibria that result from particular learning rules?
In the last few years the study of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010) . Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rules can be devised that converge to Nash equilibrium (or correlated equilibrium) in general n-person games Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006; Young, 2003, 2006; Hart and Mansour, 2010) . Among control theorists and computer scientists, the issue is not whether a given learning rule is descriptively accurate as a model of human behavior, but whether it leads to good system-wide performance when agents are endowed with this behavior; in other words the learning procedure and the agents' payoffs are treated as design elements of the system.
To date the main focus of attention has been on potential games, since these arise frequently in applications (Marden and Shamma, 2008; . For this class of games there exist extremely simple and intuitively appealing learning procedures that cause the system to equilibrate from any initial conditions. A notable example is logit learning, in which an agent chooses actions with log probabilities that are a linear function of their payoffs. In this case equilibrium occurs at a local or global maximum of the potential function. However, the potential function need not measure the overall welfare of the agents, hence the equilibrium selected may be quite inefficient. This is a well-known problem in congestion games for example. The problem of inefficient equilibrium selection can be overcome by a congestion pricing scheme, but this requires some type of centralized (or at least not fully decentralized) mechanism for determining the price to charge on each route (Sandholm, 1998) .
The contribution of this paper is to demonstrate a simple learning rule that incorporates log linear learning as one component, and that selects an efficient equilibrium in any game with generic payoffs that possesses at least one pure Nash equilibrium. (An equilibrium is efficient if there is no other equilibrium in which someone is better off and no one is worse off.) By 'select' we mean that, starting from arbitrary initial conditions, the process is in an efficient equilibrium in a high proportion of all time periods. Our learning rule is completely uncoupled, that is, the updating procedure does not depend on the actions or payoffs of anyone else. Thus it can be implemented even in environments where players know nothing about the game, or even whether they are in a game. All they do is react to the pattern of recent payoffs, much as in reinforcement learning (though the rule differs in certain key respects from reinforcement learning).
Our notion of selection -in equilibrium a high proportion of the time -is crucial for this result. It is not true that the process converges to equilibrium or even that it converges to equilibrium with high probability. Indeed it can be shown that, for general n-person games, there exist no completely uncoupled rules with finite memory that select a Nash equilibrium in this stronger sense (Babichenko, 2010 ; see also Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006) .
The learning rule that we propose is related to the trial and error learning procedure of Young (2009), and more distantly related to the 'learning by sampling' procedure of Foster and Young (2006) and Germano and Lugosi (2007) .
1 An essential feature of the rule is that a player has two different search modes: i) deliberate experimentation, which occurs with low 1 Another distant relative is the aspiration-based learning model of Karandikar et al. (1998) . In this procedure each player has an endogenously generated aspiration level that is based on a smoothed average of his prior probability and leads to a change of strategy only if the latter has a higher payoff; ii) random search, which leads to a change of strategy that may or may not have a higher payoff (the probability of acceptance is merely biased towards strategies with high payoffs).
A crucial difference between our procedure and trial and error learning is that a player does not always accept the outcome of an experiment even when it does result in higher payoffs:
acceptance is probabilistic. Our rule also differs in that the probabilities of accepting the outcome of an experiment (or of a random search) can be expressed as a log linear function of the payoff gain (in the case of an experiment) or the payoff level (in the case of a random search). The advantage of this approach is that it leads to a simple formula for computing the stochastically stable states of the process. This formula shows that the learning process selects an efficient pure Nash equilibrium whenever a pure Nash equilibrium exists, and identifies the disequilibrium states that are selected when a pure Nash equilibrium does not exist. In the latter case there is a tradeoff between welfare and stability: the most likely disequilibrium state is one that maximizes a linear combination of: i) the total welfare (sum of payoffs)
across all agents and ii) the payoff gain that would result from a deviation by some agent, where the first is weighted positively and the second negatively.
The learning model
We first describe the learning rule informally, then give a detailed definition. A key feature of the rule is that an agent can search in one of two ways. In 'quiet' search he occasionally experiments with new strategies and adopts a new one with a probability that increases with the realized gain in payoff compared to his previous strategy. In 'noisy' search he frequently tries out new strategies and adopts a new one with a probability that increases in the realized level of payoff. These two forms of search can be associated with different 'psychological states'. A content agent is not strongly motivated to search but occasionally does so anyway (quiet search). A discontent agent flails around trying out new things frequently (noisy search). In the first type of search, the probability of acceptance is determined by the change in payoff, whereas in the second situation the probability of acceptance is determined by the level of payoff. The rationale is that in noisy search an agent tries out many different payoffs. He changes strategy with positive probability if his current payoff falls below his current aspirations. Unlike the present method, this procedure does not necessarily lead to Nash equilibrium behavior even in 2 x 2 games.
strategies before settling on one of them, hence the payoff level seems more salient than the change in payoff from the previous period.
2
A second feature of the learning process is the mechanism that triggers transitions between content and discontent states. The essential idea is that a transition from content (c) to To illustrate these ideas in a concrete case, consider a commuter who ordinarily takes a certain route to work. The realized cost is the journey time (the negative of the payoff), which depends on the routes taken by other commuters. Suppose that congestion on his usual route worsens and the journey time increases. If this persists he may become discontent and start looking actively for a different route. We hypothesize that the probability of settling on a new route depends on how short it turns out to be. This is the logic of the c d c   transitions.
But even if our commuter is reasonably content, he may not be completely content, and thus may occasionally try out new ways to go to work. Our hypothesis is that he adopts such 'experiments' with a probability that is monotone increasing in the improved travel time.
We now describe the learning rule in detail. The second case is a discontent-content transition. When a player i is discontent he chooses an action at random each period, according to some fixed distribution that is independent of  and has full support on i A . Player i 's current search ends when he spontaneously accepts his current action and its associated payoff as his new benchmarks. The probability of this event this probability was assumed to be bounded away from zero and independent of  . This change in the model has important implications for its equilibrium selection properties and requires a different proof.) In summary, the parameters of the learning process consist of the experimentation probability  and the two acceptance functions ( )
Content-content transitions
We shall begin by assuming that F and G are nonnegative, strictly decreasing, linear functions, and that they are the same for all players. Later we shall show how to extend our results to the situation where the acceptance functions differ among players and are non-
We assume that the coefficients i f , i g are such that ( ) F u and ( )  G u are strictly positive for all  u U and   u U . We shall also assume that F and G are small in the following sense:
This means that the probabilities of acceptance are substantially greater than the probability of experimentation. In particular, the probability
of accepting the outcome of an experiment is greater than  ; moreover if all agents are discontent then the probability that they all become content again ( ( )  nF u ) is also greater than  . We do not claim that these bounds are best possible but they are easy to work with and yield sharp analytical predictions.
This rule can be viewed as a variant of log linear learning that we shall call log linear trial and error learning. To see the connection, let (accept experiment with payoff gain
Similarly, the log probability of accepting the outcome of a random search is 1 2
(accept search with payoff )
Notice that the probability of acceptance depends on the cardinality of the payoff gain or payoff level respectively. Hence the players' utilities cannot be rescaled or translated at will, as is the case with von Neumann Morgenstern utility functions. The larger the payoff gain from an experiment, the higher the probability that it will be accepted. Similarly, the larger the current payoff level that results from a random search, the higher the probability that the current action will be accepted. It follows that interpersonal comparisons of utility can be made, because they imply different acceptance rates among the players.
Discussion
Learning rules that employ slow and fast search have been discussed in a variety of settings.
In computer science, for example, there is a procedure known as WoLF (Win or Lose Fast) that has a qualitative flavor similar to the rule proposed above (Bowling and Veloso, 2002) .
The basic idea is that when a player's payoff is high relative to realized average payoff he updates his strategy slowly, whereas he updates quickly if his payoff is low compared to the realized average. This approach is known to converge to Nash equilibrium in 2 x 2 games but not in general (Bowling and Veloso, 2002) . Similar ideas have been used to model animal foraging behavior (Houston, Kacelnik, and McNamara, 1982; Motro and Shmida, 1995; Thuijsman, Peleg, Amitai, and Shmida, 1995) . For example, bees tend to search in the neighborhood of the last visited flower as long as the nectar yield is high, and search widely for an alternative patch otherwise (this is known as a near-far strategy). It would not be surprising if human subjects behaved in a similar fashion in complex learning environments, but to our knowledge this proposition has not been tested empirically.
In any event, we make no claim that the rule we have described is accurate from an empirical standpoint. The contribution of the present paper is to demonstrate the existence of simple, completely uncoupled rules that select efficient equilibria in a wide class of games. This addresses an important problem in the application of game theory to distributed control, where the object is to guarantee good system-wide performance using completely decentralized adaptive procedures. The issue of descriptive accuracy does not arise here, because one can build the learning rule into the agents by design. What matters is that the rule is simple to execute and requires little information. In our procedure it suffices to keep track of just three items -mood, benchmark action, and benchmark payoff -and to compare these with the received payoff each period.
Statement of the main result
Our equilibrium selection result will be framed in terms of two quantities: the welfare of a state and the stability of a state.
Welfare. The welfare of state ( , , ) z m a u  is the sum of the players' payoffs from their benchmark actions:
Stability. An action-tuple a A  is a  -equilibrium for some
The instability of a state ( , , ) z m a u  is the minimum 0   such that a is a  -equilibrium:
( ) min { : the benchmark actions constitute a -equilibrium} S z 
Notice that this result involves a cardinal comparison of the players' utilities. Players with large absolute utility are weighted heavily in the welfare function, and players with large utility differences are weighted heavily in the stability function. If a player's utility function were to be scaled up, he would count more heavily in both the welfare and the stability function. This would improve the likelihood of states in which this player has a high payoff, and decrease the likelihood of states in which this player has a large incentive to deviate.
Examples
Before turning to the proof we illustrate the result with two simple examples.
Example 1. Let  be a symmetric 2 2  coordination game with payoff matrix
Assume that the equilibrium AA is strictly risk-dominant, that is 0 a d b c     . Let us also assume that the equilibrium BB is Pareto optimal, that is, b a  . By theorem 1 the learning process selects BB , that is, the benchmark actions are BB a very large proportion of the time (and hence these actions are played a very large proportion of the time). This contrasts with many other adaptive learning procedures -including ordinary log linear learning -that select the risk dominant equilibrium in 2 x 2 games (Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993; Blume, 1993 Blume, , 1995 Blume, , 2003 . This game has no pure Nash equilibria, so by theorem 1 the learning process selects the combination that maximizes 1 Figure 2 illustrates the case 1 1 / 1 f g  in which AA is selected. In general the outcome depends on the ratio 1 1 / f g as shown in Figure 3 .
Note that the welfare maximizing state AA is selected whenever 1 1 / f g is sufficiently large, that is, whenever the marginal change in the rate of acceptance by a discontent player (for a given small change in experienced payoff), is sufficiently large relative to the marginal change in the rate of acceptance of an experiment (for a given small change in the gain in payoff). Before turning to the details of the proof we provide an intuitive outline of the argument.
When everyone is content, the learning process moves through a series of steps in which various players experiment and adopt new actions with probabilities that depend on the realized payoff gains. There are two possibilities.
1. A sequence of experiments leads to increasing payoffs for some and no decrease for anyone. In this case everyone eventually becomes content with higher payoff benchmarks.
2. A sequence of experiments ends with someone's payoff going down and staying down for two periods in a row. This person becomes discontent and starts searching widely. With some probability his searching causes other players to become discontent and they start searching.
A key part of the argument is that, once a single player becomes discontent, there is a positive probability that all players will become discontent where this probability is bounded away from zero independently of  .
The process only re-enters a content state once everyone has settled down again. By assumption the probability that everyone settles on a particular combination of actions a A  is proportional to have an advantage in the sense that the process flows into them with higher probability than to other states. However, one must also consider the probability that the process exits from any given state. Here the equilibria are advantaged because it requires at least two experiments to exit to another (non-transient) state, whereas to exit from a disequilibrium state requires at most one experiment. The essence of the proof is to show that when pure Nash equilibria exist, stability takes precedence over welfare, whereas if no pure equilibrium exists there is an explicit tradeoff between welfare and stability.
We now turn to the details of the argument. The learning process defines a finite Markov chain on the state space Z . For every two states , ' z z Z  there is a probability (possibly zero) of transiting from z to ' z in one period. We shall write this one-period transition probability 
Recall that if a player is discontent, he chooses an action according to a distribution that has full support and is independent of the current benchmark actions and payoffs. Moreover, the probability of accepting the outcome of such a search depends only on its realized payoff, and the old benchmarks are discarded. Hence, for any w D  and any z D  , the probability of the transition w z  is independent of w . It remains to be shown that there are no other recurrence classes of the unperturbed process.
We first establish the following.
Claim. Given any state z in which at least one player is discontent, there exists a sequence of transitions in the unperturbed process to D .
Consider a state in which some player i is discontent. By interdependence he can choose an action that alters the payoff of someone else, say j . Assume that i plays this action for two periods in a row. If j 's payoff decreases then in two periods he will become discontent also.
If j 's payoff increases then in two periods he will become content again with a higher payoff benchmark. At this point there is a positive probability that the first player, i , will revert to playing his original action for two periods. This causes player j 's payoff to decrease relative to the new benchmark. Thus there is a positive probability that, in four periods or less, i 's behavior will cause j to become discontent. (The argument implicitly assumed that no one except for i and j changed action in the interim, but this event also has positive probability.)
It follows that there is a series of transitions to a state where both i and j are discontent. By interdependence there are actions of i and j that cause a third player to become discontent.
The argument continues in this manner until the process reaches a state where all players are discontent, which establishes the claim.
An immediate consequence is that D is the only recurrent state in which some player is discontent. Thus, to conclude the proof of lemma 1, it suffices to show that if z is a state in which no one is discontent, then there is a finite sequence of transitions to D or to Edge resistance. For every pair of distinct recurrence classes w and z , let ( ) r w z  denote the total resistance of the least-resistant path that starts in w and ends in z . We call w z  an edge and ( ) r w z  the resistance of the edge. Note that at this point j has a new higher benchmark, namely, If there are two or more experiments, the resistance is at least two. By assumption, however,
G   , so making two experiments has a higher resistance than making one experiment and accepting the outcome (the latter has resistance 1 ( ( ))  G S z < 1.5). It follows that They all accept these actions and payoffs as their new benchmarks with probability
We claim that in fact ( ) ( ) In the next two lemmas we compute the stochastic potential of each type of recurrence class.
From these computations theorem 1 will follow.
Let z T be some z-tree with minimum resistance, and suppose that it does not contain the edge 
Since (
F u is monotone decreasing in i u , there must be some i
Consider the unique path in z T that goes from z to z ,
The resistance of the edge
Hence in the tree z T the outgoing edges from the nodes To complete the proof of theorem 1, we shall first prove the following chain of inequalities: 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have identified a completely uncoupled learning rule that selects an efficient pure equilibrium in any n-person game with generic payoffs that possesses at least one pure equilibrium. This provides a solution to an important problem in the application of game theory to distributed control, where the object is to design a system of autonomous interacting agents that optimize some criterion of system-wide performance using simple feedback rules and that require no information about the overall state of the system. The preceding analysis
shows that this can be accomplished by a variant of log linear learning and two different search modes -deliberate experimentation and flailing around. Theorem 1 shows that by choosing the probabilities of experimentation and acceptance within an appropriate range, the process is in a welfare-maximizing equilibrium a high proportion of the time. This allows one to reduce the price of anarchy substantially, because one need only compare the maximum welfare state to the maximum welfare equilibrium state. As an extra dividend we obtain a simple criterion for the selection of disequilibrium states. This criterion weights total welfare positively and the incentive to deviate negatively. As we have shown by example this concept differs from risk dominance.
It is, of course, legitimate to ask how long it takes for the learning rule to reach an efficient equilibrium from arbitrary initial conditions. Prior work would lead one to expect that it may take an exponentially long time to learn Nash equilibrium as a function of the number of players, though this has only been shown for procedures that actually converge to Nash equilibrium (Hart and Mansour, 2010) . Faster learning may be possible if one only insists on coming close to equilibrium with high probability, but this is a complex issue that we shall not attempt to address here.
Finally, we should note that the kind of learning rules we have described are not meant to be empirically descriptive of how humans actually behave in large decentralized environments.
Our aim has been to show that it is theoretically possible to achieve efficient equilibrium selection using simple, completely uncoupled rules. Nevertheless it is conceivable that certain qualitative features of these rules are reflected in actual behavior. At the micro level, for example, one could test whether agents engage in different types of search (fast and slow)
depending on their recent payoff history. One could also estimate the probability that they accept the outcome of a search as a function of their realized payoffs. At the macro level, one could examine whether agents playing a congestion game converge to a local maximum of the potential function, to a Pareto optimal equilibrium, or fail to come close to equilibrium in any reasonable amount of time. Whether or not our learning model proves to have features that are descriptively accurate for human agents, the approach does suggest some testable questions that to the best of our knowledge have not been examined before.
